


Mr. Mays version



XXV Club - A group of elderly prominent citizens who use the facilities of the Hope Club four or five times a year to which they invite someone of national prominence to sit and talk to them informally -- they are not necessarily members of the Hope Club --

Mr. Brown's secretary

A gourmet club meets on the first Monday of every month from September to July. Try to keep it to 25 people. They have a three course meal and a guest speaker. At one time it was members of the Hope Club but it is no longer confined to members of the Club. Mr. Buckley, Jr. of the firm of Buckley & Scott handles arrangements for these meetings (oil heating apparatus firm in Providence).

[Handwritten mark]
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Been President NWC and RI resident for 1 and 1/2 years.

Talk about my part in RI.

Important changes 3 fronts - interest to all in RI

1. NWC - Changed philosophy

new curriculum

2. Rhode Island - (Newport in particular)

Sea component of USN withdrawn

New character to USN in Newport shaping up

Dink
3. World Scene Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003700060001-9

Optimism - perhaps over-optimism of year ago on detente gone -
instead -

Mid East War and Energy Crisis - *Economy*

Skepticism - questioning how all going

so well with old opponent -

so many problems at home

Let me start with Detente

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Detente

- Over-optimism: expected too much too fast

Washington correspondent

- Why over-optimistic?

Looked at detente only from our point of view

Assumed Soviet view was same

- U.S. viewpoint - 2 reasons for detente:

1 rational Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003700060001-9

(1) tension on one hand,

vast stocks nuclear weapons on other.

Danger was obvious

(2) No ambitions/unfulfilled needs that require competition
with Soviets

(3) Perfectly happy to forego/not take advantage
Risk - advantages
Do not fear USSR, despite Cold War years.

Partly because: superior militarily and economically
all those years.

Partly because: never attacked^{WY 102}/invaded at home.

2 Second reason - revulsion to Vietnam
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- pushed emotionally into detente
- opportunities appeared to offer avoid war

- alternate uses of \$

Study detente today - ask?
Did these conditions exist in Soviet Union as basis for accepting
Emotional? Now - public opinion not allowed to give emotional
thrust to policy.

Rational? Reasons same ~~same~~ ^{Approved For Release 2005/11/23}? CIA-RDP80B01554R003700060001-9

1. Soviet homeland invaded repeatedly. Wary of entrusting future to another's goodwill or intentions.
 2. Soviets clearly have external ambitions.
 - in part from ideological belief that until capitalism suppressed everywhere, it will be aggressive.
 - in part have external ambitions because haven't been global power we have in past 30 years.
 - We humiliated them - from their point of view in Lebanon-58
- Cuba & Berlin-62
- N. Vietnam-72

3. Today moving toward global power status - as emerge from being continental power into maritime power projection around globe -
not just across frontiers.
- ~~Four detente rational approach existed w/ US & USSR~~
4. If Soviets not have same rational impulses, why did they accept detente?
- We wanted to play that game
 - Opened possibilities solving domestic problems
 - Saw tactical advantages - easing pressure on one front while dealing with China on other. *for instance*
 - + because in period relation could apply different, diverse pressures allies in Europe

But

Whatever their real reasons - Reasons
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- tells us detente means something different to each of us - without casting accusations of disingenuousness/malevolence/false intent.
- Simply had different reasons.

To Soviets means shifting competition with us to non-military arenas:

- Must expect continued competition

Anyone - allies - business - politics - commercial - reaction
- Must expect Soviets to overreact if tempted

- Did in Mid East when going well for Egypt/*Syria*
- Did in grain deal - not understand our reaction.
Detente meant US hands off internal affairs
- Did on suppression of dissent (*Solzhenitsyn*)

Analogy to faithfulness to wife - easy when no opportunity.
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We must not provide Soviets opportunities. - *push non-pool competitor*
In part means continued diplomatic efforts.

In part that means remaining militarily strong.

On military side:

- One facet of that strength particularly important - deterrent impact of our peacetime readiness and to show our military force around world.
- Do not want to fracture detente by having to restrain Soviets militarily. Want to eliminate any temptation.
- Make clear we have power and the will to use it.

- Detente only works from positions of equality. With USSR continuing
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to build military forces at accelerated rate, not the time for us to
dismantle our military - or permit it to weaken through obsolescence.
- Special emphasis on Naval Forces - best suited to go anywhere in world
and demonstrate our interests and capabilities to support those interests.
- ~~Deterrence~~ - more difficult for military officer to understand complexities of ~~deterrent impact~~ of military force than its war fighting potential.
- Warfighting -
- More we emphasize
detente, naval or other
forces - more soph
must become
- Hardware }
Tactics } Basics of our trade
Morale }
- Deterrence -
- Psychological
Perceptions
"Mind-reading"

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In addition, not forget importance of negotiating from strength

- Change in military demands of differently educated officer, ergo,
changed War College curriculum.

10 month course

LCDR/MAJ - CAPT/COL

Approx: 450 students

All services/DOD civilians

Curriculum:

Mid-career

- changed from factual, International Affairs thrust

- to accent on decision-making in several environments:

Strategy

Management of Resources

Tactics

- Back to Mahan's philosophy.

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- Facts obsolesce quickly;

~~Improving thinking patterns and ones approach to problems changes an individual for rest of his life.~~

- Stress rational analytic processes for arriving at sound decisions in areas where uncertainty exists.
- Practice dealing in the kinds of problems surrounding defense decisions daily.

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War College here to stay - increasingly important to have officers
who can understand these complexities.

Year ago - Spruance

This week - Connelly move

Hewitt coming along
changes in War College symposium
Part of change of Navy's character in Newport -

When sea component leaves 1 April NETC. - *OCS*

Predict expanding role of education and training in Navy - and
within Navy in Rhode Island - Newport